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SMITH, District J. 
 Petitioner Furniture Rentors of America, Inc. ("FRA") 
appeals from a National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the 
Board") order holding that it violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) 
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and 
(5) ("NLRA" or "the Act") by withdrawing recognition from its 
union without having reasonable grounds for doubting its majority 
status, and by failing to notify and bargain with the union 
before subcontracting out delivery services.  Cross-petitioner 
NLRB seeks enforcement of its order.  We will enforce the Board's 
order only in part. 
 I.  Background 
 Withdrawal of Recognition 
 Furniture Rentors of America, Inc. ("FRA"), a Delaware 
corporation, is a regional renter of residential and office 
furniture in Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware.  The company 
negotiated its initial collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") 
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union Local Nos. 639 
and 730  ("Union") on November 1, 1986.  As drafted, the CBA was 
  
to expire on October 31, 1989; however, on October 21, 1987, a 
side-letter agreement was reached which increased wages and 
extended the CBA until December 31, 1989, and provided that the 
contract could be reopened "only to discuss wages." 
 In October 1988, FRA leased a warehouse in Jessup, 
Maryland, implementing its decision to move its center of 
operations from Alexandria, Virginia to a point between 
Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C., more centrally located 
within its market.  FRA continued to operate from its Alexandria 
warehouse until late 1989 because its lease there did not expire 
until the summer of 1990 and its Jessup facility was being 
renovated.  Due to the longer commute from northern Virginia to 
Jessup, Maryland, FRA lost several Washington area employees and 
hired new ones from Baltimore, including Calvin Wilson, who was 
hired as a new warehouse manager.   
 FRA and the Union began negotiating their next CBA in 
the autumn of 1989.  Petitioner contends that by that time, fewer 
of FRA's employees than ever before were Union members, as 
evidenced by dues check-off records.  On October 6, 1989, a 
decertification petition was filed by Frederick Brown, one of the 
new employees who had been hired by warehouse manager Wilson.  
Prior to the filing of the petition, Brown had posted a notice in 
the Alexandria warehouse which asked employees to sign "for the 
Union" or "not for the Union."  Only six employees signed "for 
the Union."  There were also discussions between warehouse 
manager Wilson and other employees regarding their lack of 
interest in Union representation and discontent over having to 
  
pay Union dues and initiation fees.   At a December 7, 1989 
bargaining session, FRA Vice-President James Senker ("Senker") 
questioned the Union's majority status.  The Union 
representatives responded that they did enjoy majority support.  
On January 17, 1990, Senker sent a letter to the Union 
withdrawing recognition based on his doubt that the Union 
represented a majority of FRA employees.  The Union failed to 
respond.  A January 20, 1990 bargaining session was cancelled, 
and the parties did not meet again. 
 Decision to Subcontract Delivery Services 
 Senker knew first-hand that FRA had experienced serious 
problems with employee theft and carelessness.  In May and June 
of 1989, FRA investigated the theft of furniture by Union members 
at a loss to the company of $10,000.  The investigation led to 
arrests and resignations of employees.  Delivery service also was 
the cause of numerous customer complaints, and FRA experienced 
problems with furniture packing, delivery of damaged furniture, 
insurance claims and late deliveries.  FRA delivery teams 
averaged three deliveries per day, compared to the industry 
standard of four or five deliveries per day.  In August 1989, FRA 
fired three employees who raided a customer's refrigerator while 
relaxing in his apartment during what was supposed to be a 
routine delivery. 
 In mid-February 1990, Senker accepted a proposal by 
Sullivan Services, a contractor who provides trucking services, 
to share delivery services on a trial basis.  For approximately 
one week, Sullivan Services made deliveries using a single crew 
  
and its own truck.  Senker gave the Sullivan Services crew the 
hardest jobs, monitored their performance, spoke daily with 
Sullivan Services' President, Kent Sullivan, and visited job 
sites in order to talk with customers about the Sullivan Services 
crew's work.  Senker did not retain Sullivan Services beyond that 
trial period. 
 On February 27, 1990, Senker received a tip that 
several FRA employees planned to steal furniture early the next 
morning.  With the assistance of the Howard County (Maryland) 
Police, Senker apprehended a driver, a helper and a supervisor 
attempting to load furniture onto a delivery truck.  The next 
day, without notifying the Union, Senker retained Sullivan 
Services to perform FRA's delivery work on an exclusive basis.  
FRA then terminated four drivers and three helpers, but continued 
to employ its warehousemen, several of whom were Union 
supporters.  By using Sullivan Services to perform delivery 
services, FRA's delivery costs increased from $160 to $210 per 
day. 
 Union member Alvin Jones, Jr. and the Union filed 
charges against FRA on March 2, 1990 and March 12, 1990 
respectively.  On March 28, 1991, the NLRB issued Complaints 
against FRA in 5--CA--20933 and 5--CA--21038.  These Complaints, 
which were subsequently consolidated for hearing, alleged that 
FRA committed unfair labor practices when it posted a petition 
requesting that its employees indicate their union sympathies, 
unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union, and subcontracted 
  
its delivery work to Sullivan Services without first notifying 
and bargaining with the Union. 
 An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing from 
October 1-3, 1991.  On May 13, 1992, the ALJ issued a decision 
that FRA had committed unfair labor practices in violation of 
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA when it interrogated 
employees about their union sympathies and withdrew recognition 
of the Union on January 17, 1990.  The ALJ, however, relying upon 
the NLRB's decision in Dubuque Packing Company, Inc., 303 NLRB 
386 (1991), concluded that FRA's decision to subcontract its 
delivery work was not a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining and that therefore FRA did not violate Section 8(a)(5) 
of the Act when it decided to subcontract without first 
bargaining with the Union.  The ALJ's decision with respect to 
mandatory bargaining particularly hinged upon his finding that 
FRA's decision to subcontract delivery services "did not turn on 
labor costs in any way."  App. 684 
 On May 28, 1993, the Board issued a Decision and Order 
reversing the third part of the ALJ's decision, holding that FRA 
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by failing to 
provide notice and to bargain with the Union concerning its 
decisions to subcontract delivery work and to lay off seven 
employees as a result of that decision.  The Board also held that 
FRA violated Section 8(a)(1) through statements made by warehouse 
manager Wilson to new employee Alvin Jones, Jr. threatening to 
fire Wilson because of his association with the Union.  FRA 
  
petitioned for review of the Board's order and the Board cross-
petitioned for enforcement of its order. 
 II.  Discussion 
 Withdrawal of Recognition 
 FRA argues that its proper withdrawal of recognition 
from the Union ended any duty to bargain over its decision to 
subcontract delivery services.  Whether petitioner properly 
withdrew recognition from the Union turns on the factual question 
whether FRA had reasonable grounds for doubting the Union's 
continued majority status.1   
 FRA avers that its move from Alexandria, Virginia to 
Jessup, Maryland caused considerable employee turnover, and by 
January 17, 1990, the date Senker withdrew recognition, only six 
of 17 employees, all transferees, were members of the Union.  No 
newly hired employee had executed a dues checkoff or expressed an 
interest in union representation.  Therefore, FRA argues, the 
composition and attitude of its workforce had changed, supporting 
Senker's good faith doubt about continued majority status.  
Employee turnover alone, however, is not sufficient to establish 
good-faith doubt, NLRB v. Oil Capital Elec., Inc., 5 F.3d 459, 
462 (10th Cir. 1993), for without objective evidence of 
                     
1
  After one year beyond the date the NLRB certifies a union as 
the collective-bargaining representative of employees, the 
presumption of the union's continued majority status becomes 
rebuttable; the employer may withdraw recognition if it can show 
that the union has lost majority support or that it has a good 
faith, reasonable doubt of the union's continued majority status.  
NLRB v. Wallkill Valley Gen. Hosp., 866 F.2d 632, 636 (3d 
Cir.l989). 
  
dissatisfaction, "there is nothing to rebut the presumption that 
the [company's] newly hired employees supported the Union in the 
same ratio as the employees they replaced."  Spillman Co. and 
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc., Local Union No. 24, AFL-CIO, 
311 NLRB 18.  See also NLRB v. W.A.D. Rentals Ltd., 919 F.2d 839, 
841-42 (2d Cir. 1990)(500 percent employee turnover did not 
overcome presumption of majority employee support for union where 
employer was found to be "stalling" to avoid bargaining with the 
union).  Therefore, petitioner must adduce evidence of 
dissatisfaction with Union representation among its employees. 
 Petitioner's evidence of FRA employees' dissatisfaction 
with Union representation consists of the low number of employees 
who executed the dues checkoff and the petition signed by a 
majority of employees stating that they were "not for the Union."  
Instantly, only six of 17 or 20-262 employees had executed dues 
checkoffs at the time petitioner withdrew recognition.  A high 
number of resignations or a low number of dues checkoff 
authorizations will not without more justify withdrawal of 
recognition, although they may be considered when assessing 
majority support for a union.  Bickerstaff Clay Prods. Co. v. 
NLRB, 871 F.2d 980, 989 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 
924 (1989).  As this court has said, "the issue is 'not how many 
employees belong to the union or paid dues but rather whether the 
                     
2
  Petitioner's brief is not consistent with respect to the 
number of employees working for FRA on January l7, l990.  Compare 
Petitioner's Brief at 7 (20-26 employees) with Petitioner's Brief 
at 36 (l7 employees). 
  
majority desired union representation for purposes of collective 
bargaining.'"  NLRB v. Walkill Valley General Hosp., 866 F.2d at 
637 (quoting Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 491 
(2d Cir. 1975)).  As the ALJ noted, the fact that less than a 
majority of employees have dues checked off does not ipso facto 
indicate opposition to union representation.  See Colonna's 
Shipyard, 293 NLRB 136, 139 (1989).  In order to overcome the 
presumption of majority union support, the employer must produce 
affirmative evidence of dissatisfaction sufficient to ground a 
good faith doubt of continued majority status. 
 Substantial evidence supports the Board's determination 
that FRA's petition was tainted because it was posted by FRA, 
albeit indirectly, rather than spontaneously by the employees 
themselves.  An employer may only conduct polls to determine 
whether a union's majority status still exists if it "possesses 
substantial, objective evidence to establish that it reasonably 
doubts the union's majority status before conducting the poll."  
Hajoca Corp. v. NLRB, 872 F.2d 1169, 1173 (3d Cir. 1989)(emphasis 
added).  An employer may not use its petition/poll as evidence of 
its good faith doubt, because in order not to engage in unfair 
labor practices, it must have had such doubt supported by 
independent evidence before posting the petition.  Cf. NLRB v. 
Laverdiere's Enterprises, 933 F.2d 1045, 1051 (1st Cir. 
1991)(employee contact with employer regarding union 
representation lessens finding of taint). 
 Management Rights Clause 
  
 The employer argues that the original CBA contained a 
broad management rights clause giving FRA the absolute right to 
subcontract work at any time until December 31, 1989, the date of 
contract expiration.  Furthermore, FRA avers, when the CBA was 
reopened in October 1987, the parties to the contract agreed that 
renegotiations on December 31, 1989 would be limited to the 
discussion of wages only, and that all other contract terms were 
to continue beyond the expiration date.  Therefore, petitioner 
concludes, FRA's contractual right to subcontract continued 
beyond December 31, 1989, the Union having waived its right to 
bargain over subcontracting. 
 We conclude that when the CBA was reopened in October 
1987, the Union did not waive its right to bargain after December 
3l, l989 over every contract term except wages.  The 1987 
reopener language states in pertinent part that, "The contract 
shall ... remain in effect through December 31, 1989, but the 
parties will agree to meet to reopen the contract to discuss only 
wages."  This language can most sensibly be read to mean that 
prior to the expiration of the contract on December 31, 1989, 
only wages could be changed, but when the contract expired, all 
terms were subject to bargaining.  Although it is possible to 
derive FRA's construction from the reopener langugage, we decline 
to make the inference, for waivers of statutorily protected 
rights must be clearly and unmistakably articulated.  
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).  
Without such a clear waiver, the management rights clause does 
  
not survive the expiration of the CBA.  Control Services, Inc., 
303 NLRB 481, 484 (1991), enforced 961 F.2d 1568 (1992). 
 Statutory Duty to Bargain 
 Finally, FRA argues that the Board employed the wrong 
legal standard and thus erred when it determined that FRA's 
decision to subcontract its delivery work was a mandatory subject 
of bargaining.  Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(a)(5) and 158(d), require employers to bargain in good 
faith with employee representatives about, inter alia, "wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employement."  Relying 
on its recent decision in Torrington Industries, 307 NLRB No. 129 
(1992), the Board held that FRA's decision to subcontract 
delivery work fell within the range of decisions that require 
bargaining.   
 Subcontracting may be a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining under the Act, but it is not necessarily so.  In 
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), the 
Court determined that an employer violated Section 8(a)(5) of the 
Act when it contracted out maintenance work in order to reduce 
labor costs without first bargaining with its maintenance 
workers' union.  The Court noted that the employer subcontracted 
its maintenance work in order to reduce costs by "reducing the 
work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime 
payments," and stressed that these factors were customarily 
regarded within the industry as "peculiarly suitable for 
resolution within the collective bargaining framework."   Id. at 
213-14.   
  
 The Supreme Court further defined the requirements for 
mandatory bargaining over subcontracting when it held, in First 
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), that an 
employer is not obligated to bargain with the union before 
closing a part of its business and discharging the employees who 
worked in that part of the operation.  In First National, the 
Court identified three types of management decisions:  (1) those 
with "only an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment 
relationship"; (2) those that "are almost exclusively 'an aspect 
of the relationship' between employer and employee," such as "the 
order of succession of layoffs and recalls ... [and] work rules"; 
and (3) those "that [have] a direct impact on employment ... but 
have as [their] focus only the economic profitability of" non-
employment-related concerns.  Id. at 677.  Because the First 
National employer's decision to terminate one part of its 
business affected employment but was motivated by considerations 
unrelated to the employment relationship, it fell into the third 
category of management decisions.  Whether decisions within that 
category require mandatory collective bargaining, the Court 
reasoned, depends upon the extent to which "the subject proposed 
for discussion is amenable to resolution through the bargaining 
process."  Id. at 678.  Accordingly, bargaining over "management 
decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued 
availability of employment should be required only if the 
benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective 
bargaining-process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of 
the business."  Id. at 679.   
  
 The First National balancing test was not conceptually 
novel, and the Court noted that the Fibreboard Court performed 
the same analysis "implicitly."  Id.  The Court in First 
National, reached the opposite result from Fibreboard because the 
employer's decision to close part of its business was not driven 
by labor costs.  The Court concluded that because the union had 
no control over the factors motivating the company's decision to 
subcontract, collective bargaining would have been futile and was 
therefore not required. 
 In Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB 891 (1984), and Dubuque 
Packing Co., 303 NLRB 386 (1991), the Board followed the teaching 
of Fibreboard and First National by fashioning standards for 
mandatory bargaining that focused generally on the amenability of 
the disputed issue to resolution through the collective 
bargaining process, and specifically on the role of labor costs 
in the employer's decision.  See Dubuque Packing Co., 303 NLRB at 
391; Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB at 892, 897 (Dennis, 
concurring).  The Dubuque decision in particular contained a 
thoughtful discussion of the bargaining obligation imposed by the 
Act that accurately reflected the framework established by 
Fibreboard and First National, see United Food and Commercial 
Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 150-A v. NLRB, 1 F.3d 24, 32 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993)(NLRB's finding that the Dubuque test "accords with 
precedent is fully defensible"), but its holding was expressly 
limited to decisions to relocate unit work.  Dubuque Packing Co., 
303 NLRB at 390 n.2. 
  
 In the matter sub judice, the ALJ applied the Dubuque 
burden-shifting test,3 concluding that because labor costs did 
not prompt FRA to subcontract, its decision was not a subject of 
mandatory bargaining.  App. 684-86.  Within days after the ALJ 
issued his opinion, however, the Board issued its decision in 
Torrington Industries, 307 NLRB 809 (1992), which abandoned the 
flexible approach of Dubuque for a more rigid standard in 
subcontracting cases.  When the ALJ's decision was appealed to 
the Board, therefore, the panel applied the more recent 
Torrington standard. 
 In Torrington, the employer unilaterally replaced two 
union truck drivers with non-bargaining unit drivers and 
independent contractor haulers.  The Board rejected the 
employer's argument that its decision to replace the union 
truckers was entrepreneurial and did not turn on labor costs, 
holding that Dubuque's burden-shifting analysis is limited to 
relocation decisions and does not apply to "other types of 
management decisions that affect employees."  Torrington, 307 
NLRB at 810.  Finding that "all that is involved is the 
                     
3
  Under the test announced by the Board in Dubuque, the General 
Counsel must initially establish a prima facie case for mandatory 
bargaining by showing that the employer's decision involved a 
transfer of unit work unaccompanied by a basic change in the 
nature of its operation.  Then, the burden of production shifts 
to the employer, who can rebut the prima facie case by showing 
that its decision involved a change in the direction of the 
business, or by showing "(l) that labor costs (direct and/or 
indirect) were not a factor in the decision or (2) that even if 
labor costs were a factor in the decision, the union could not 
have offered labor cost concessions that could have changed the 
employer's decision... ."  Dubuque, 303 NLRB at 39l. 
  
substitution of one group of workers for another to perform the 
same work at the same plant under the ultimate control of the 
same employer," id. (quoting Fibreboard), the Board held that the 
employer had an obligation to bargain.  In so doing, the Board 
established the following test for subcontracting cases: 
 [W]hen the record shows that essentially 
[Fibreboard] subcontracting is involved, 
there is no need to apply any further tests 
in order to determine whether the decision is 
subject to the statutory duty to bargain.  
The Supreme Court has already determined that 
it is....   
Id. (citation omitted).  The Torrington Board did not reject 
outright the employer's argument that Fibreboard could be 
distinguished because labor costs were not a factor in its 
decision; rather, it chose not to reach that issue, "because the 
[employer's] reasons had nothing to do with a change in the 
'scope and direction' of its business.  Those reasons, thus, were 
not matters of core entrepreneurial concern and outside the scope 
of bargaining."  Id. (citation omitted).  Unwilling to consider 
the specific facts of the case, the Board simply determined that 
FRA had engaged in "Fibreboard subcontracting," triggering the 
mandatory duty to bargain. 
 Inflexibly applied, the holding in Torrington is at 
odds with the principles of Fibreboard and First National.  Those 
cases discussed the statutory duty to bargain as a means of 
obtaining, when appropriate, the benefits presumed to attend the 
collective bargaining process, see Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213-14 
(bargaining over particular economies potentially derived from 
  
subcontracting deemed "peculiarly suitable for resolution within 
the collective bargaining framework"); First National, 452 U.S. 
at 681 (relevant question is "whether requiring bargaining over 
this sort of decision will advance the neutral purposes of the 
Act"), not as an end in itself.   
 The Board's decision in Torrington to limit the scope 
of Dubuque to relocations of unit work is essentially a policy 
choice "subject to limited judicial review."  NLRB v. Local Union 
No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron 
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978)(citations omitted).  However, 
the Board's virtual per se rule that subcontracting decisions 
must be the subject of bargaining is fundamentally an 
interpretation and application of Supreme Court precedent, and 
while it must be upheld if reasonably defensible, we may not give 
it "rubber stamp" approval if it is "inconsistent with a 
statutory mandate or ... frustrate[s] the congressional policy 
underlying [the NLRA]." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. 
FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983)(quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 
292-92 (1965)). 
 Under the Torrington standard, if an employer 
subcontracts some work to nonunion workers without changing the 
scope and direction of its enterprise, and the nonunion workers 
perform essentially the same work as the bargaining unit workers 
did, the Board labels the employer's action "Fibreboard 
subcontracting" and requires bargaining.  But the Torrington 
manner of examining the decision to subcontract only to see 
whether it is analogous to Fibreboard's general factual framework 
  
is simplistic and, as this case demonstrates, potentially ham-
handed.4  The focus in determining whether a particular 
management decision requires bargaining under Section 8(a)(5) is 
not the employer's decision to subcontract, but whether 
"requiring bargaining over this sort of decision will advance the 
neutral purposes of the Act."  First National, 452 U.S. at 681.  
In order to determine that, it is necessary to look behind the 
subcontracting decision itself to the reasons motivating the 
decision.  If the employer's decision was prompted by factors 
that are within the union's control and therefore "suitable for 
resolution within the collective bargaining framework," 
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 214, then bargaining is mandatory.  As 
the Board recognized in Dubuque, 303 NLRB at 392 n. 14, it is 
therefore imperative to "evaluate the factors which actually 
motivated the employer's" decision. 
 Fibreboard itself counsels against strict 
categorization according to the form of subcontracting.  The 
                     
4
  Although conceptually simple, the Torrington approach is not 
well-fitted to the statutory duty to bargain, which, after all, 
is not simply a theoretical catchphrase, but implies real give 
and take negotiations.  If during a bargaining session an 
employer were to broach the subject of contracting work out 
(whether or not in a manner similar to what the Board calls 
"Fibreboard subcontracting"), the negotiations would necessarily 
turn to the employer's reasons for wanting to contract the work 
out.  The contracting out decision itself, regardless of what 
form it might take, is just a response to some underlying cost or 
other challenge that makes doing the work with bargaining unit 
employees relatively less attractive.  Therefore, focusing on the 
form that the employer's decision takes (does it fit into the 
Fibreboard piegonhole?) is unhelpful, for the form of 
subcontracting bears little on the bargaining process encouraged 
by the Act. 
  
Fibreboard Court expressly noted that the employer's decision to 
subcontract turned on its desire to lower "the high cost of its 
maintenance operation," which, independent contractors had 
promised, could be reduced by eliminating employees and benefits.  
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 213-14.  In determining whether a 
subcontracting case is legally similar to Fibreboard, it is 
important to consider not just the employer's decision to 
contract work out, and how that decision affects its operations, 
but whether, as in Fibreboard, the employer's decision was driven 
by labor costs or some other difficulty that can be overcome 
through collective bargaining.  Those courts that have held an 
employer's decision to subcontract unit work was a mandatory 
subject of collective bargaining under Fibreboard have invariably 
made this finding.  See e.g., Olivetti Office U.S.A., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 926 F.2d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 
168, 116 L.Ed.2d 132 (1991)(employer transferred work in order to 
"reduce manufacturing costs by $2.6 million, $2 million of which 
would be directly attributable to cheaper labor....  Obviously, 
labor costs were the driving force behind the Company's action"); 
NLRB v. Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec Corp., 870 F.2d 1112, 1116 
(6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 891 (1989)(decision to 
subcontract motivated by failure to successfully negotiate 
economic concessions); W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 860 F.2d 244, 
248 (7th Cir. 1988)(decision to subcontract delivery services 
motivated by the desire to reduce the cost of "branch time," or 
time drivers' spent at depots rather than in truck, and thus was 
a "direct labor cost"); NLRB v. Westinghouse Broadcasting and 
  
Cable, 849 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1988)(decision to subcontract 
prompted by a directive from employer's parent company to reduce 
its "body count" by eleven persons). 
 In this case, the ALJ found that,  
    From the time [FRA Vice-President] James 
Senker started with [petitioner] he noted 
that [petitioner] had a serious employee 
theft problem.  Indeed two employees, Payton 
Finch and Terry Walls, were arrested in mid-
1989 for larceny from [petitioner].  In 
addition, service was, in Senker's opinion, 
horrible and Senker demonstrated part of the 
basis for this conclusion by producing 
correspondence from three customers, 
TravCorps, NV Property and North Park Ave, 
complaining about Respondent's services.  In 
August 1989 three employees were fired for 
misconduct during a delivery, i.e., they 
"hung out" in the customer's residence and 
ate food which they took from the customer's 
refrigerator.  Senker also observed that 
because of careless handling of furniture and 
improper padding of furniture by 
[petitioner's] delivery crew employees that 
too much of the furniture [petitioner] rented 
was being damaged.  It was also Senker's 
opinion that [petitioner's] delivery crews 
were unreasonably slow in doing their job 
since they were making an average of three 
and one-half stops per day rather than four 
or five which was the industry standard. 
 
    The straw that broke the camel's back and 
motivated Senker to subcontract all the 
delivery work began in late February 1990 
when Senker received information from a 
confidential informant that some of his 
employees were planning to steal some 
furniture.... 
 
    The cost of delivery services by Sullivan 
Services was more expensive than the cost to 
[petitioner] of doing the delivery work with 
its own employees, i.e., $160 per day for one 
of [petitioner's] crews versus $210 per day 
for a Sullivan Services Crew.... 
  
 
    Labor costs were not a factor in the 
subcontracting decision.  The decision was 
made because of [FRA Vice-President] Senker's 
dissatisfaction with the delivery crews, 
e.g., lower than expected productivity, 
unacceptable damage to furniture, complaints 
by customers, and thievery. 
App. 685-86.  The Board purported to leave these findings 
unchanged, App. 691, n.1, but stated that because all of 
petitioner's stated reasons for subcontracting delivery services 
"involved employee conduct, an issue which would be of concern to 
the Union as well as to [petitioner] and an issue over which the 
Union was in a strong position to take action," App. 692, 
petitioner's decision to subcontract delivery services was 
subject to mandatory bargaining.   The ALJ's phrase 
"lower than expected productivity," standing alone, rings of 
labor costs, a subject suitable for resolution through collective 
bargaining.  However, the ALJ's decision read as a whole 
indicates that Senker's principal reason for turning to Sullivan 
Services was his exasperation over the irresponsibility and 
dishonesty of some of his delivery employees, not labor costs as 
traditionally understood.  Petitioner argues that labor costs 
could not possibly have been the basis of its decision since it 
paid fifty dollars per day more to contract out its delivery 
services than it paid to employ its own delivery crews.  The 
Board responds by characterizing even "employee work habits and 
conduct" as "labor costs in the broad sense of the term" because 
they "affect the employer's costs and thus the profitability of 
the business."  NLRB Brief at 38-39.  
  
 Anything employees do, or do not do, that ultimately 
bears on their employers' economic condition may be designated a 
"labor cost" in some broad sense, but there is no reason to so 
expand the term beyond its ordinary meaning as used in Fibreboard 
and First National, which contemplates subjects such as wages, 
fringe benefits, overtime payments, size of workforce and 
production goals.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit recognized in Arrow Automotive Indus., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 853 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1988), employers may make business 
decisions based on general "economic reasons," which "are not 
reasons distinct and apart from a desire to decrease labor 
costs," but that does not mean that labor costs are somehow 
implicated by every employer's decision intended to improve the 
business's bottom line. Id. at 228. 
 Similarly, that an employer's decision is based on 
factors "involv[ing] employee conduct" does not necessarily imply 
that labor costs or other concerns amenable to resolution through 
collective bargaining are central to the decision.  The factors 
that principally motivated FRA Vice-President Senker to contract 
out delivery services were, as found by the ALJ and as supported 
by the record, FRA's continuing problems with delivery workers' 
carelessness, misconduct, untrustworthiness and thievery.  The 
Board suggests that "education," or the implementation of "an 
effective anti-theft program" would serve the same purpose as the 
wage and benefit concessions discussed in Fibreboard and First 
National.  We do not read Fibreboard and First National as 
requiring employers to automatically bargain with employee 
  
representatives over the inviolability of their own property, 
without regard to the benefit likely to be obtained from that 
process.  Nor are we able to perceive any likelihood of benefit 
to be derived from subjecting the problem of employee thievery to 
collective bargaining.   
 Our purpose in making these observations is not to 
substitute our judgment for that of the Board's on the possible 
benefits to be derived from collective bargaining in a situation 
like the one in this case.  We intend only to convey our concern 
that the Board has not exercised the judgment that Fibreboard and 
First National require of it.  We believe the Board needs to 
acknowledge that FRA's decision to subcontract its delivery work 
was primarily based on factors arguably not as amenable to 
collective bargaining as direct labor costs.  The Board then 
needs to make a judgment about the likelihood and degree of 
benefit, if any, to be derived from collective bargaining in a 
situation of this kind and to weigh that benefit against the 
employer's considerable interest in taking prompt action.   
 III.  Conclusion 
 We will grant the Board's petition to enforce with 
respect to those provisions of its order designed to remedy the 
unfair labor practices related to FRA's withdrawal of 
recognition.  We will deny its petition in all other respects.  
We will grant FRA's petition for review and remand for further 
proceedings on the charge that FRA violated sections 8(a)(1) and 
(5) of the Act by failing to provide notice and bargain with the 
  
Union concerning its decisions to subcontract its delivery work 
and lay off employees. 
